Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act, was designed to protect people from lawsuits aimed at silencing legitimate speech, petitioning activity, and participation in government. (Much like its corollaries in other states, including Illinois.) It was never intended to immunize threatening or harassing conduct simply because that conduct arose in the shadow of a legal dispute. A recent decision from the First Court of Appeals in Houston underscores that distinction in unusually vivid terms.
The case arose against the backdrop of separate litigation brought by the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the State Bar of Texas. In that underlying matter, the Committee alleged that Allison Lartigue and her entity, The Freelance Paralegal, LLC, were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Karleana Farias, an attorney, had been assigned to investigate complaints made against Lartigue.
While that matter was pending, Lartigue sent Farias multiple emails and repeatedly called her law office. According to the appellate opinion, one email warned Farias to disclose certain information “or else I will have the police knocking on your door.” When Farias asked that all further communications go through counsel and requested that Lartigue stop contacting her directly, Lartigue replied with a single word: “nah.” The communications escalated from there. Additional emails accused Farias of criminal conduct, insulted her office, threatened that she would “suffer,” and suggested Lartigue would come by the office. Farias sued for civil stalking and sought injunctive relief. Lartigue responded with a TCPA motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was based on protected speech and petitioning activity connected to the unauthorized-practice litigation.
The Court’s Reasoning
The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court focused on the TCPA’s threshold language, which requires the movant to show that the legal action “is based on or is in response to” protected expression or a statutorily covered act. That language mattered. The court explained that it would not simply accept a defendant’s broad characterization of the dispute as litigation-related speech.
Here, the stalking claim was not based on Lartigue’s participation in the UPLC proceeding as such. It was based on the threatening and harassing nature of the communications themselves. Even if some of the messages touched on issues related to the underlying proceeding, that did not transform the conduct into protected TCPA activity.
Lartigue also argued that the statute applied because the dispute was connected to the communication, gathering, or processing of consumer complaints. The court rejected that argument as well, emphasizing that even if the broader context involved consumer complaints, the stalking claim itself was not based on or in response to those protected acts. Because the TCPA did not apply at the first step, the court never needed to reach the issues of prima facie proof or affirmative defenses.
Why This Ruling Matters
The opinion provides a useful reminder that anti-SLAPP statutes are powerful but not boundless. A defendant cannot convert threatening conduct into protected speech simply by placing it near an ongoing lawsuit or administrative matter. Courts will look at what the plaintiff is actually suing over, not just the setting in which the conduct occurred.
The decision also offers a practical lesson for litigants and counsel. Emotions often run high during disputes involving professional accusations, investigations, or reputational harm. But direct communications that become menacing, abusive, or persistent can create separate exposure that procedural defenses like the TCPA will not erase.
For lawyers advising clients in active disputes, tone and method of communication still matter. The right to advocate is broad, but it does not extend to conduct that crosses the line into intimidation.
